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Abstract 
 
This paper puts forward the notion of pragmatic citizenship and forms part of the ongoing 
re-appraisals of citizenship in relation to national identity in an attempt to make it more 
relevant and inclusive for those with complex identities, legal status and, in particular, the 
stateless. Using the case study of Palestinians in Athens to discuss relationships between 
citizenship, identity and statehood, this paper argues that the notion of pragmatic 
citizenship can be useful in such re-conceptualisations as it can take into account the 
potentially ambivalent and multiple feelings of belonging that migrants and those in 
diaspora may have. In the process it stresses that strong notions of belonging and 
attachment to a territorialised homeland do not have to be exclusive or problematic. The 
paper outlines the complexity of Palestinian legal status in Athens and the feelings of 
injustice statelessness can provoke; it then describes the process of Palestinian acquisition 
of pragmatic citizenship in Greece. However, the final section of the paper highlights that 
such a notion of citizenship can have positive repercussions in terms of inclusive visions 
of a future one-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
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Palestinians and pragmatic citizenship: negotiating relationships between 
citizenship and national identity in diaspora 
 
 
Introduction 
Relationships between citizenship and national identity are becoming increasingly 
complex as migrants and those in diaspora have multiple attachments, feelings of 
belonging and political loyalties. The notion of the decoupling of citizenship and identity 
(Isin and Wood, 1999) may help to describe such changes and forms part of ongoing re-
conceptualisations of citizenship in host societies. In particular, for migrants and those in 
diaspora, there may be a decoupling of citizenship and national identity whereby they 
obtain citizenship in the host country but continue to feel attached to their homeland. 
Such a de-territorialisation of the nation across state boundaries has triggered notions 
such as ‘instrumental citizenship’ and ‘flexible citizens’ (Ip et al 1997; Waters, 2003; 
Ong, 1999). Drawing on such ideas, this paper puts forward the notion of pragmatic 
citizenship1 as a way to highlight the strategic element of migrant/diasporic citizenship 
acquisition that enables and allows for multiple feelings of belonging that are positioned 
at particular times/spaces for particular reasons. In the process, although it is inclusive, it 
does not deny people the right to belong and form strong attachments to place(s), 
particularly the homeland, which for those in diaspora can continue to be important. 
 Pragmatic citizenship forms part of the ongoing re-conceptualisation of 
citizenship in an attempt to make it more inclusive and relevant for migrants and those in 
diaspora who may have complex and ambiguous legal status, feelings of belonging and 
                                            
1 I am grateful to Cheryl McEwan for suggesting this term. 
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relations to the state. At the same time, because it involves the acquisition of Western-
state citizenship it may be seen as a strategic form of citizenship that arises out of 
necessity, particularly for those who are stateless. Although there may be increasing 
cross-border connections that transgress state-controlled boundaries, such boundaries 
continue to exist. Those without formal citizenship status can feel marginalised and 
trapped. As a result, they may attach great importance to the acquisition of Western state 
citizenship. This paper examines such pragmatic citizenship and its relationships to 
national identity in relation to the Palestinian diaspora in Athens and their desire to attain 
Greek citizenship without letting go of their politicised belonging to Palestine and wish 
for self-determination and a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
In relation to this, Stein and Swedenburg (2004: 11) have argued that: “the 
present-day (and past) conflict between Palestine and Israel illustrates the ongoing 
violence associated with the enduring exclusivist ideologies of the national”. 
Exclusionary notions of national identity and its relationship to citizenship within new 
states created as a result of self-determination may have significant implications for 
future citizenship laws, official membership of and inclusion within such newly formed 
states. As the notion of pragmatic citizenship does not necessarily demand full belonging 
to the host country, it can encourage strong feelings of belonging to the homeland and 
potentially lead to the normalising and accentuating of relationships between citizenship 
and national identity in a future state and/or homeland. However, as this paper will 
illustrate such perceptions do not have to be exclusive or problematic.  
This paper is based on in - depth qualitative research carried out in 2003-2004, in 
which 54 Palestinians were interviewed informally using key gatekeepers who were 
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accessed using the Palestinian Representation in Greece, the Parikia (or Palestinian 
community house) and snowballing techniques. These interviews were loosely structured 
around key themes but were open-ended enough for respondents to discuss issues they 
felt were important. If permission was given, interviews were tape-recorded and then 
transcribed. A system of coding around the key themes of home/belonging/national 
identity, politicisation/political activities, diasporic spaces and citizenship was then 
employed. Although the process of speaking to a wide cross-section of Palestinians in 
diaspora in Athens led to a variety of responses and opinions, this was seen in positive 
terms and highlighted the diversity of Palestinian experience in Athens. At the same time, 
it also allowed the exploration of difference as well as similarity.  
The authors own positionality as non-Palestinian and non-Arab (and non-Arab 
speaking) was also important, as was the fact that research was being conducted for a 
British University; this had varying implications. On the one hand, some respondents felt 
honoured and happy that research was being conducted on what they thought and that 
their voices could be heard; on the other, some were suspicious and this resulted in the 
researcher having to justify and explain the research rationale and motives at length. 
Therefore, issues of trust were important; the nine month length of this project reflected 
the need to build up trust, acceptance and support over time. Not being able to speak to 
respondents in Arabic was also seen as a limitation; respondents were interviewed in 
either Greek or English, whichever they felt most comfortable and fluent in. However, 
this did not limit the choice of interviewee as on no occasion were participants excluded 
because of language. The main issue was the fact that they would have felt more at ease 
had Arabic been spoken and the nuances of certain notions might have been easier to 
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discuss and articulate. The choice of interviewees for inclusion in this paper reflects their 
particular interests in and viewpoints on the relationships between citizenship and 
national identity; however, in the research itself, Palestinians from a wide range of 
backgrounds and with varying opinions were spoken to. 
After a discussion on theoretical perspectives on citizenship and national identity 
as well as an outline of Palestinian legal status and perceptions of injustices in Greece, 
the paper focuses on the acquisition of pragmatic non-Palestinian citizenship and 
illustrates how many Palestinians remain emotionally attached to Palestine. The final part 
of this paper is perhaps the most important as it discusses the viewpoints of Palestinians 
in Athens with inclusive views on national identity and future statehood for Jews and 
Arabs in historical Palestine. 
 
Deconstructing citizenship and national identity 
Citizenship is a contested and complicated notion (Faulks, 2000). It can be seen as a set 
of practices and processes that allow individuals to construct, negotiate and position 
themselves spatially and temporally for strategic and legitimising purposes. There are a 
“staggering array of different policies and arrangements that further complicate any 
understanding of what precisely citizenship is” (Croucher 2004: 45). For example, Davis 
(1997: 3) has defined citizenship in western liberal democratic states in terms of the equal 
(civil, power-political, social service and material) resource rights afforded to citizens. 
Faist (2000: 202) has stressed that citizenship forms “a series of reciprocal transactions 
between a citizen and the state”, highlighting that citizenship is a two way process, where 
a citizen has duties as well as rights. However, duties should not necessarily depend on 
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exclusive notions of identity. A decoupling of citizenship and identity (Isin and Wood 
1999) does not necessarily mean that such rights and duties are ignored or are less 
important but highlights that citizenship needs to be less exclusive. At the same time, for 
migrants and those in diaspora, who want to obtain pragmatic citizenship, notions of jus 
soli and jus sanguinis citizenship, where the former refers to membership rooted in soil 
and the latter to membership rooted in blood (Croucher, 2004) influences how easy it is 
for them to be granted this citizenship. For the latter (as is the case in Greece), in 
particular, relationships between national identity and citizenship may be seen as 
exclusive as states may expect their citizens to belong exclusively to the nation-state. 
Relationships between national identity and citizenship can be summarised as 
follows: “who gets defined as a ‘true’ citizen within the city-state or nation-state depends 
in part on who carries with them what is deemed to be the correct baggage of history, 
ethnicity, language and religion” (Painter and Philo, 1995: 112). Citizenship envisioned 
in such simpler or more traditional ways encourage definitions and validations based on 
official belonging to a country, which is linked to national identity. This can explain why 
people who have an ambiguous relationship with the ‘nation-state’ or who are not 
‘nationals’, a concept that Castles and Davidson (2000: 84) call an “intrinsically 
particularistic and exclusionary category”, can be excluded or discriminated against.  
In simplistic terms, it is often assumed that the people within a nation-state 
constitute a nation, and possess feelings of national identity and nationalism. According 
to Smith (1999: 37), nationalism is: 
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an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity 
and identity of a human population, some of whose members conceive it to 
constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’. By a ‘nation’, I mean a named human 
population sharing a historical territory, common myths and memories, a mass 
public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members. 
 
The assumption that there is a naturalised and potentially exclusive relationship 
between territory, national identity and citizenship, whereby national identity is neatly 
located in a clearly demarcated and bounded nation-state can be seen as problematic. In 
relation to this, Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002: 302) have noted that what they call 
‘methodological nationalism’ is “the assumption that the nation/state/society is the 
natural social and political form of the modern world”. It is such assumptions, they argue, 
that have deeply influenced academic theories within the social sciences and that also 
may explain why “the lack of a temporal and spatial fit between state and nation is one of 
the main causes of many of today’s national conflicts” (Smith, 1999: 38). Despite the 
relevance of the homeland for diasporic and migrant populations, the fact that there are 
thousands of perceived homelands located in less than 200 nation-states could be seen as 
problematic if self-determination is seen as a right. According to Davis (1997: 24), the 
idea of a nation-state and self-determination has been given   
 
international legal legitimisation with the proclamation of the Fourteen-
Point programme by Woodrow Wilson, 1918 and the proclamation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
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Peoples by the United Nations, 1960. Established modern international legal 
terminology has since been predicated on the concept of ‘nations’ and 
‘peoples’…and the norm of the right of ‘nations’ and/or ‘peoples’ to self-
determination which, in turn, is posited as the legitimising principle for the 
claim of the ‘people’ to sovereignty in the form of a ‘nation-state’ of its 
own.  
 
Khalidi (1997: 209) illustrates the salience of such issues when he asks the open-
ended question of whether the limited success in creating a Palestinian ‘identity’ will 
“finally allow the achievement of self-determination, statehood, and national 
independence the modern world has taught us is the “natural state” of peoples with an 
independent national identity like the Palestinians”.  Statements such as this are justified 
by current understandings and uses of the relationships between national identity, 
citizenship and territorial nation-states, even if contemporary societies are much more 
complex and diverse in reality.  
Although Palestinians in diaspora may still feel attached to a Palestinian 
homeland, the fact that many are acquiring pragmatic citizenship elsewhere and, 
therefore, may have multiple feelings of belonging, raises questions for their relationship 
with a future Palestinian state, especially if they want to return. This forms part of the 
wider debates around the de/re-territorialisation of the nation and the ability and need for 
migrants and those in diaspora to remain rooted and belong to their homelands and 
countries of origin even as they may acquire pragmatic citizenship elsewhere.  
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Such imagined communities (Anderson, 1983) have been seen as an important 
aspect of national identity and nationalism. As a result, a strong symbolic attachment to 
one another and a territorialised state or homeland must be imagined in order to create a 
shared sense of belonging and sustain a nation-state, which can no longer be maintained 
by traditional face-to-face contact and which may also extend across borders, in the form 
of long-distance nationalism (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2001; Skrbis, 1999), for 
example. Nationalism can also potentially (and unsurprisingly) lead, therefore, to what 
Gilroy (1999) has called ‘ethnic absolutism’ or extreme forms of nationalism that can be 
seen behind tragic processes such as ethnic cleansing and some homeland-orientated 
politics (Carter, 2005). As this paper will show, however, self-determination and the need 
for strong feelings of belonging to a nation and/or state do not have to be exclusive and 
can be based around more inclusive notions of belonging and citizenship. 
 
Pragmatic citizenship 
The acquisition of pragmatic citizenship forms part ongoing re-conceptualisations of 
citizenship. Citizenship is being critically reappraised in order to make it relevant to the 
needs of and more inclusive for people today, such as women (McEwan, 2000) and 
migrants (Croucher, 2004; Benhabib, 2004) who are being potentially excluded or 
marginalised. This may be particularly the case for migrants and those in diaspora who 
are stateless or whose citizenship status is ambiguous and/or decoupled from the national 
identity of the host country in which they reside. The decoupling of citizenship and 
national identity illustrates that they may have voluntary multiple attachments and 
affiliations, which may stretch beyond the borders of the state in which they are currently 
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citizens. As Nagel and Staeheli (2004: 6, citing Mandaville 1999) note: “immigrant 
groups (or diasporas and transmigrants) are said to exist in a new global market of 
political loyalties, engaging in a complex politics of ‘here and there’ and resisting 
attempts by the state to “fix parameters of political community and territory” and to 
assimilate newcomers into a national’s culture”. 
As Nagel and Staeheli (2004: 4) also argue: “it is possible to claim identity as a 
citizen of a country and to negotiate membership within the bounds of ‘belonging’, even 
without claiming to ‘be of’ that country”, thus breaking the assumed congruity between 
citizenship, state and nation.  In relation to this, Soysal (1998: 210, 209) has argued that 
“the idea of nation becomes insignificant, a mere trope of convenience for claims to 
collective rights and identity”. For Soysal, post-national membership is a more relevant 
notion, whereby “an identity politics energised by narratives of collective pasts and 
accentuated cultural differences, becomes the basis for participation and affords the 
means for mobilising resources in the national and world polities”. In a similar vein, 
Tambini (2001: 212) feels that ‘post-national citizenship’ is becoming more important as 
“the meaning and content of national belonging will be transformed as the structural basis 
of national citizenship continues to be undermined”. Such notions have important 
implications for the practices and processes of citizenship within and beyond states, as 
they may be able to make citizenship more relevant and inclusive for migrants and those 
in diaspora with complex and ambiguous relations to the state. At the same time, 
however, feelings of national belonging to the de/re territorialised nation and/or 
homeland continue to be important for many in diaspora and this cannot be ignored. 
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This paper adds to such debates on citizenship and its relationships to national 
identity by putting forward the concept of pragmatic citizenship, or citizenship that is 
sought, acquired and negotiated for pragmatic and strategic reasons and can result in dual 
or multiple feelings of belonging and attachment as well as de/re-territorialisation. It may 
be seen as similar to the notion of ‘instrumental citizenship’ discussed by Aguilar (1999) 
which denotes the fact that home states accept the fact that although their émigrés may 
have citizenship and formal belonging in another state, they still are emotionally attached 
to their homeland and make allowances for this. In this way, they are still treated as part 
of a nation that is spread out and de-territorialised. Such a notion of citizenship is also 
reminiscent of the work by Ong (1999) on flexible citizens, whereby there is the 
acquisition of multiple passports as a means of security as well as the work of Waters 
(2003) where Canadian citizenship and the ‘spreading out’ of families is also used 
strategically in the education of Chinese migrants. Such a focus on the importance and 
use of passports is central to notions of pragmatic citizenship, whereby the strategic 
acquisition of citizenship is equated with the acquisition of a passport for security, social 
and economic reasons, rather than strong or exclusive belonging to the host state.  
This paper attempts to illustrate that such pragmatic citizenship can have varying 
repercussions in terms of perceptions of the relationships between citizenship and 
national identity because it may depend on where such perceptions are directed: the host 
state or the homeland. Pragmatic citizenship may encourage the decoupling of the 
relationships between citizenship and national identity in the host state, whereby migrants 
and those in diaspora do not possess strong feelings of belonging to that state. This may 
also lead to feelings of ambivalence, in-between-ness as well as the negotiation of dual or 
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multiple attachments to place and territory. However, this can also lead to the coupling of 
the relationships between citizenship and national identity in the homeland or future state, 
particularly if the group in question involved in nation-state building. Pragmatic 
citizenship may take on special significance for such groups because it can be seen as a 
way to gain citizenship status and the rights and privileges this affords without the need 
to fully belong to the host state and without the need to ‘let go’ of attachments to the 
homeland. In turn, this may also fuel perceptions of the nature of citizenship and its 
relationships to national identity in the homeland and/or future state that are not 
necessarily exclusive. 
Before an in-depth discussion of empirical evidence to explore such issues, it is 
necessary to examine the complexities of citizenship and legal status of Palestinians in 
Greece. This, and the contextual background that follows, will help illustrate why the 
relationships between citizenship and national identity are important to these exilic and 
diasporic Palestinians as they engage in politicised discourses of nation-state building and 
self-determination that are often based on negative perceptions of statelessness and 
injustice.  
 
Palestinian perceptions of injustice and legal status 
According to the Palestinian representation in Greece, there are roughly 4000 Palestinians 
in Greece; most live in Athens, but they are also spread around Greece in cities such as 
Thessaloniki and Patras. The arrival of the Palestinian diaspora in Athens is relatively 
recent. As a result, most Palestinians in Athens are first-generation migrants. Its first 
members started arriving in Greece in the late 1960s. There are various Palestinian 
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‘groups’ in Greece. Some are currently students, some came as students, finished their 
studies and found work, others came as students and did not finish. Others arrived as 
skilled or unskilled workers; the former can be split into those who work for foreign 
owned companies in Greece and who may feel their presence in Greece is more transient 
and insecure and those who do not (for more on the different groupings of Palestinians in 
Greece, see Shawa, 2005).  
Many are not Greek citizens as Greek citizenship is granted on a jus sanguinis 
basis and is closely guarded (Rozakis, 1996) and is often difficult to obtain as a result 
(Fakiolas, 1999). Therefore, many are dependant on work and residence permits in order 
to live there and with often-difficult legal statuses see the acquisition of Greek citizenship 
as a desirable and pragmatic solution to this. Palestinians constitute a diverse group of 
people and there are differences in their legal status, which often depends on whether 
they originated from what is now Israel or the West Bank/Gaza and where, if anywhere, 
they have moved to before coming to Greece. This research reveals that Palestinian 
residency and official statuses in Athens are complex, often confusing and consequently 
difficult to generalise about. Therefore, this background information is not exhaustive but 
an introduction to illustrate Palestinian perceptions of injustice and discrimination as a 
result of statelessness and exile.  
Due to fighting during 1947-1948 and the creation of the state of Israel, the 
majority of Palestinians fled or were expelled from the area that is known as historical 
Palestine, mainly into the Middle East.2 For example, those from what is now is now 
Israel who went to Lebanon and Egypt after 1948, were given travel documents in these 
                                            
2 For an overview in terms of their citizenship status in the Middle East and beyond see Karmi and Cotran 
(1999). 
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countries, but not citizenship, which often makes travelling difficult, although 
naturalisation amongst Palestinians in Lebanon is increasing (Peteet, 1996, cited in 
Lindholm Schulz, 2003: 54). Lindholm Schulz (ibid.) also stresses that “exclusion and 
marginalisation remain the most prominent feature of the Palestinian experience in 
Lebanon”.3 Those who went to Jordan form a large percentage of the population there 
and were given Jordanian citizenship, with the exception of those from Gaza, who hold 
Egyptian travel documents (ibid.: 46).  From 1994, the Palestinian National Authority 
issued identity cards to Palestinians in the West Bank (see Kelly, 2006 for more on this). 
A proportion also stayed in Israel, becoming Israeli citizens and forming around 20% of 
the population. Secondary waves of migration also saw many Palestinians move to the 
Gulf States (although the Gulf War in 1990/1991 forced many to move again) and North 
America.  
It has to be noted that the definition of Palestinians as refugees can be 
problematic. Although most Palestinians in Athens are not registered refugees, they may 
come from refugee families, who may or may not be registered with the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA); alternatively, they may view all Palestinians as 
displaced refugees in a more general sense. According to Lindholm Schulz (2003: 35, 
36), UNRWA was created in 1950 to ‘rehabilitate’ Palestinian refugees, which also 
means they are excluded from the 1951 Geneva Convention on the State of Refugees. 
Therefore, they are not fully protected by any international body. There are also 
Palestinians who have not been included in UNRWA definitions of refugee status such as 
those who fled to countries where UNRWA does not operate. For the purposes of this 
                                            
3 For more information on Palestinians in Lebanon see, for example, Shiblak (1997) and Sayigh (1994). 
. 
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paper, it suffices to say that many Palestinians in Athens perceive the problems they face 
in terms of legality, movement, displacement and discrimination could potentially be 
solved by the creation of a Palestinian state.  
The ability of Palestinians to enter and reside in Greece aptly illustrates the issues 
surrounding mobility, legal status and consequent feelings of insecurity and injustice. 
Entering Greece students appears to have been a relatively easy for Palestinians. As 
Layla, explains: “Greece was the only country that would accept me…my parents were 
told at the time by friends that it was very easy to get a student visa to come to Greece, so 
we went to the Greek Embassy in Abu Dhabi where we were living at the time and they 
gave me a student visa for 3 months”. The choice of Greece as a destination for 
Palestinians students may be partly explained by the popular (and to a lesser extent, 
political) support the Palestinian cause has tended to receive in Greece (Smith, 2002). At 
the same time, however, despite this support, evidence from this research suggests that 
Palestinians without Greek (or other Western country) citizenship status are often 
plagued by feelings of insecurity, despite the fact that many appear to enjoy living in 
Greece. For example, Lina stresses that: “Now, that I have the Greek passport, I am okay, 
but before it was a big problem”. Residency issues are problematic and as Layla points 
out: “we are at the mercy of Greek law; if it changes, we are lost”.   
This research suggests that Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza face 
considerable restrictions in travelling, both within the Middle East and elsewhere if they 
hold a Palestinian passport. It has to be noted that Palestinians in Athens perceive this 
passport differently. Some see it as a legitimate and official document, legalising their 
status as Palestinian. Others are more pessimistic, arguing that it is a fake document that 
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does not mean very much because Israel controls who is and is not allowed to have one, 
which for them, nullifies its validity. Many also feel that they are always singled out and 
discriminated against because they are stateless, which highlights them as different. For 
example, Mustafa says: “I have a Palestinian passport. It’s not like a proper passport, it’s 
more of a travel document; it’s difficult to get a visa with it (He shows it to me. On it, the 
words ‘Palestinian passport’ and ‘travel document’ are both written). It’s hard because 
with every application you make, every procedure, you are in another category; you’re 
singled out as different, needing special treatment”.  
       Other Palestinians, particularly those who moved to Egypt and Lebanon, also 
emphasise their lack of rights as well as restricted movement. Ahmed, whose family 
settled as refugees in Lebanon after 1948, but who himself lives in Greece as a result of 
his job at a foreign owned company, describes the situation and the material 
consequences for his present documentation, which he himself finds confusing: 
 
We [Palestinians] have travel documents in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt – they 
gave them to Palestinians who left in 1948 and then in 1967 they give another travel 
document but whoever registered in Lebanon in 1948, they have these travel documents 
and those who left in ’67 don’t have the travel documents that we have. 
 
Interviewer: They have something different? 
 
Ahmed:  Actually, I don’t know exactly. For example, they have the right to go back to 
the West Bank. We don’t have this right even with these peace negotiations…I carry a 
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Syrian passport. It was granted to my dad by a general who became the president of 
Syria and he granted very few of them, so he’s carrying a Syrian passport, my son, but 
he knows that he is not Syrian. You know he asked me, how come I have a Syrian 
passport when you say I am Palestinian. Sometimes you feel it must be so frustrating for 
him. He cannot understand, it’s very difficult.            
 
Many interviewees from historical Palestine have no right to go to the West Bank and 
Gaza, let alone visit what many see as their homeland (which now encompasses Israel). 
For example, Faeq stresses his anger at what he perceives as the injustice of this: “I don’t 
have the right as a 1948 refugee even to ask for the Palestinian passport. I can’t get 
it…because you know that passport is better than what I’m having now, the Lebanese 
travel document. It’s ridiculous and that’s why they don’t want to give us the right to go 
back there”. Both quotations above also highlight the complexities surrounding 
Palestinian legal status as well as the number of categories from which Palestinians have 
the potential to be included and excluded. The mobility restrictions they face are well 
illustrated by Layla, whose family are refugees who originally moved Lebanon but whose 
immediate family now live in Abu Dhabi, as she responds to a question on how easy it is 
for her to travel: 
 
(Laughs) It’s impossible! Because I remember, before 6 or 7 years, my friends – they 
were immigrants to Canada, so I just wanted to go there to Canada. They gave Hassan 
[Layla’s son] the Greek passport, this is another story (laughs) – they told me that my son 
could go without a visa, but that I do need a visa. Okay, I applied for a visa but they 
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refused to give me one so I couldn’t go to see my friends. Also, if I want to visit my 
parents in Abu Dhabi, I need a visa but Hassan doesn’t. My parents applied to go to 
Canada to but they didn’t get in but my brother and sister did. There are a lot of 
difficulties for Palestinians. When we talk to other nationalities, they always ask are you 
crazy? Nobody can believe our situation. 
 
 The complexities of diasporic Palestinian legal and citizenship status make their 
future inclusion into a Palestinian state potentially problematic, especially if they wish to 
return. Although diasporic Palestinians not originally from the West Bank and Gaza (as 
well as those from these areas originally who have moved away) may be allowed 
Palestinian citizenship in an eventual Palestinian state, they may not want to relinquish 
the Right of Return to their original historical homeland, an issue that many Palestinians 
in Athens have started thinking about. The Right of Return of Palestinian refugees forms 
part of the Palestinian cause and it highlights the need to deal with displaced Palestinian 
refugees, particularly those living in the Middle East, who, according to the United 
Nations, have the right to return to the homes they were originally displaced from. 
 Linked to this is the fact that there are some Palestinians in Athens who find the 
acquisition of non-Palestinian citizenship as politically disloyal to the Palestinian cause 
and are quite happy to remain ‘in-limbo’ indefinitely, without citizenship, in order to 
highlight the fact that they are stateless and displaced Palestinian refugees with the Right 
to Return to (historical) Palestine. This is legitimised by international law (for more on 
this see Al-Qasem, 1999), but is problematic within a two-state solution, as Israel is 
unlikely to allow such refugees to return to their original homes. According to 
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Rabinowitz (2001: 82), for example, the Oslo-Wye process of reconciliation between 
Israel and Palestine states that a two state solution is viable but assumes that only those 
Palestinians originally from the West Bank and Gaza will be entitled to citizenship in a 
Palestinian state. This means that “all Palestinians living elsewhere…are somehow 
expected to merge somehow into their current host societies”. Such a solution also means 
that refugees in diaspora from what is now Israel will not be able to return to their 
original homeland. The issue of not being able to return can often be frustrating for those 
in diaspora to deal with. For example, Jamal discusses his own feelings on the matter:  
 
Interviewer: And if a Palestinian state is created, will Palestinians such as yourself in the 
diaspora have the right to go and live there if you want to? 
 
Jamal: This is under negotiation. How can they have the right to say and decide whether 
I am Palestinian or not? This means they can take your rights and, therefore, your hope, 
away from you; somebody is doing your negotiation on your behalf and they will pay you 
money. What is this? Who has the right and the idea to do this? And nobody can claim 
that it [the land] is not ours…I can’t imagine what will happen to me if they claim that I 
am not Palestinian. So what kind of compensation can they give to me and by whom? 
 
Although he lives in Greece, Jamal’s family moved to Egypt from Gaza and his 
testimony below illustrates the difficulties he has encountered as a result: 
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I have Egyptian travel documents – they are the worst travel documents used by the 
Palestinians because actually we don’t have the right to go back to Egypt and it causes 
us a lot of problems until now. I have been in Greece for almost 9 years and I have been 
given residence by my job for the last 8. Suddenly, they started saying that I am not 
Palestinian. The authorities… started saying that I was not Palestinian, but Egyptian, but 
I’m not Egyptian and they said that I have to pay IKA [social insurance] because there is 
an agreement between the government and Egypt that citizens of both countries pay IKA 
in both countries so after 8 years they realised that I was not Palestinian although on my 
permit it wrote Palestinian, suddenly they said, no you are Egyptian and I have to pay the 
IKA for the last 8 years and double the amount as a penalty, which is something like 
150,000 dollars, which of course I couldn’t pay so for the last 9 months I am staying in 
Greece without legal status, I cannot move or travel, I cannot go to my family who live in 
Egypt and I’m stuck and I don’t know if it will be solved or not. If I am caught, I could be 
deported to where I don’t know, because there is no country I can go to. I don’t really 
belong anywhere; there is nowhere I can go to legally. I am trapped here; it’s a prison 
for me. This is my situation for the last 34 years – this is how old I am. Because people 
see you as someone without a state, without citizenship and they don’t want to take you 
and the ones that take you see you as a burden. 
 
Such realities and perceptions of insecurities, injustice and suffering seem to form a 
significant part of the need to have an official Palestinian state, which many interviewees 
feel is important in order to deal with statelessness and the problems and insecurities they 
perceive this causes. As Sana states, “Palestinians outside Palestine are often left with 
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nothing, nothing formal, no citizenship…if you can’t travel as a result or do the things 
you want to do, you will say why me? It’s not fair”. Therefore it is unsurprising that there 
is a perceived need amongst Palestinians in Greece to remain politicised, attached to 
Palestine and to feel Palestinian regardless of citizenship status. Many also feel that the 
political need to link future statehood with a Palestinian ‘identity’ is important even as 
they acquire pragmatic citizenship. However, this does not necessarily prevent them from 
feeling ambivalent about their notions of home and belonging (see Mavroudi, 
forthcoming) or from having dual or multiple feelings of attachment. 
 
Palestinian acquisition of pragmatic citizenship 
This research reveals that for Palestinians in Athens, pragmatic citizenship appears 
closely related to the holding of passports that enable travelling and afford more 
protection and security. As Lindholm Schulz (2003: 188) points out: “what appears to be 
significant to Palestinians living in Western countries is the sense of security provided by 
the passport and by the political system”. The acquisition of a passport through pragmatic 
citizenship proves official belonging to those who are stateless but it increasingly does 
not have to necessitate strong or exclusive feelings of national belonging to the country 
whose citizenship has been obtained but may encourage or allow for hyphenated 
identities, multiple or dual attachments/feelings of belonging. This does not necessarily 
mean that pragmatic citizenship is an inferior form of citizenship but that it is strategic 
and allows for a variety of outcomes in terms of feelings of home, belonging, attachment 
and territorialisation, whilst helping to deal with complex legal status and feelings of 
discrimination and injustice. 
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The strategic element of pragmatic citizenship is illustrated, for example by 
Layla: 
 
When I get the Greek nationality, maybe I’ll go back to live with my parents … So, if I am 
able to find a good offer in Abu Dhabi I will go…If I go now, maybe I can, maybe I can’t, 
I haven’t looked in to the possibility. As a European, I will gain triple the money. If I go 
as a Palestinian – my brother, he is married, he works there. He’s a human resource 
manager. If he works with his Palestinian travel document, he would gain 3 or 4,000 but 
with his Canadian nationality he earns about 13,000 just because he’s Canadian, it’s 
ridiculous. He said to me, please don’t come back until you take the Greek nationality, 
because otherwise you will not live like us and you will live like you live in Greece, with 
little money. With our names, our nationality, we cannot live a good lifestyle. 
 
Layla is also acutely aware of the benefits of Greek citizenship for her son and her 
account of the difficulties encountered whilst trying to secure this also illustrate the 
importance attached to pragmatic citizenship as well as the problems Palestinians face:  
 
Let me tell you the story of my son – how we got his passport. I am Palestinian with the 
Lebanese travel documents. My ex-husband, he’s Palestinian with Syrian travel 
documents. I don’t have the right to give my son the Lebanese travel documents. I mean I 
can’t put his name on my passport. Also my ex-husband, he lost his civil rights in Syria, 
because he was against the government so he had the Yemeni passport. These passports 
were given to the PLO as presents to make life easier for these people in the PLO but 
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they were not allowed to give them to their children or their family so as you can 
understand, the conclusion of this was that my son was without a nationality. 
 
Interviewer: Where was he born? 
 
Layla: Here in Athens…something in the Greek law says that if a person was born in 
Greece and he can’t get either his mother’s or his father’s nationality, so he can get a 
Greek nationality, so this is what happened. It was very difficult for me for 2 and half 
years until he got it; it was a nightmare for me. So for 2 and half years I couldn’t travel, I 
couldn’t go anywhere; he had no papers, just the birth certificate. But all this happened, 
and now I’m really happy that this happened because he got a good passport; he can go 
and do whatever he wants; it’s good for his future. 
 
  The acquisition of pragmatic citizenship from Western countries increases access 
to Israel/Palestine, an issue many Palestinians in Athens find important. Many want to be 
able to go back, either to visit or to live and for many this is an active strategy that is 
pursued. As Ibrahim explains:  
 
We cannot go there; it’s difficult for us to go, that’s why we need to get Greek citizenship 
- so that we can go there…I wouldn’t have a problem getting it. Getting it doesn’t change 
where you’re from and who you are though. I would still feel Palestinian. I could become 
Greek and get involved here and do everything Greeks do but people can belong to two 
countries. 
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Ibrahim reiterates the fact that pragmatic citizenship can encourage feelings of dual 
attachment and belonging, whereby he feels it is acceptable to become a Greek citizen 
and belong there whilst still maintaining his feelings of being Palestinian which are very 
strong and which he does not want to let go of. Sa’id also usefully describes the 
acquisition of pragmatic citizenship in other Western countries: “Palestinians go to these 
countries, they say they’re going to stay 3 years. If they have problems with the Israeli 
government, prosecution or anything, they know that when they leave that they cannot go 
back to see their family with the Palestinian passport they have. So then they ask for 
asylum and as soon as they get the citizenship they go back”.  Sa’id is referring to the 
general situation in Western countries, not Greece, as claiming asylum in Greece is an 
arduous process and few Palestinians have been granted it.  He himself has Jordanian 
citizenship, but points out: “I’m not allowed to go. I have to get another citizenship in 
order to go.” His personal strategy to overcome this is studying political science to 
become a diplomat, in which case he believes “the Israelis won’t be able to touch” him. 
Because access to Palestine/Israel is controlled by Israel, Palestinians need Western state 
citizenship before they are allowed to enter their homeland and this is something that they 
often find unfair.  
Pragmatic citizenship can facilitate access to the homeland without the need to 
form exclusive or full attachments to either the host country or homeland. This is another 
reason why pragmatic citizenship in a Western state is seen as so important. It does not 
stop Palestinians from being passionately attached to Palestine as a territorialized 
homeland to belong to, whether they have been or lived there or not and whether they 
might want to return there to live or not. What is less clear is how Palestinians in diaspora 
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will react of they are not automatically entitled to citizenship in a future state, or they are 
not given the right to return and therefore, may feel excluded. Jamal illustrates these 
issues well:  
 
I don’t want to give up my belonging, that I am Palestinian. I love my country; I love 
being Palestinian. I love my homeland. This is something I cannot give up. If they would 
give me any nationality or any kind of compensation I would not give it away because it’s 
not for sale; it cannot be changed. It’s a human right to feel that you belong to some 
place.                                                                               
 
Jamal does not feel that the acquisition of pragmatic citizenship is problematic because 
he will continue to feel Palestinian whether or not he is allowed to return to live there. 
Likewise, Tariq, who is a Greek citizen, and has been living in Greece for over twenty 
years and is married to a Greek, believes his feelings of being Palestinian “will never 
change. My roots, my origins are Palestinian. And my papers write this, I’m not just 
saying it”. This is despite the fact that he, like other Palestinians with Greek citizenship 
who have lived there for a considerable amount of time may also feel Greek to a greater 
or less extent. Even Palestinians in Greece who are more ambivalent about their notions 
of home and belonging maintain that they still feel Palestinian even if they may also feel 
Greek, Arab, or a mixture.  
 The perceived need for a politicised Palestinian identity to help ensure that 
Palestinians achieve statehood is seen as paramount. This belief can be summarised as 
“the creation of a Palestinian land for Palestinian people, where they can be free and have 
 25
all their rights” (Abbas) and “We are entitled to an independent Palestinian state. We are 
entitled to an identity” (Rafat). Such feelings of needing to hold onto a Palestinian 
identity are also triggered by insecure legal status and feelings of marginalisation and 
discrimination, as Faeq points out: “they [the Greek authorities] don’t write that I am 
Palestinian, when I am. They don’t have a Palestinian category; we don’t exist”. Among 
some respondents, this appears to have also led to a need to prove that they are 
Palestinians as a defensive mechanism. Mahmud, for example, stresses that he is a 
“genuine Palestinian. I have a Palestinian identity card and passport” (italics added).  
Lindholm Schulz (2003: 88) explains that: “the Palestinians are constantly faced 
with suspicion, harassment and exclusion because they cannot prove a national identity, a 
citizenship legally inscribed in their passports”. However, she also claims that “the 
condition of being Palestinian…is to move” (ibid.: 87). Therefore, because they are in 
exile and stateless, they feel they have to acquire pragmatic citizenship which can lead to 
feelings of belonging in the host society. However, at the same time, because there is no 
Palestinian state, such belonging can be ambivalent and be seen as problematic and is 
often accompanied by politicised feelings of ‘Palestinian-ness’. For example, they may 
feel ‘at home’ in Greece, but feeling Palestinian and belonging to Palestine often comes 
first because of the current situation and unresolved conflict there. However, what is 
important about such attachments is that they are not necessarily exclusive of others, but 
are based around the need to belong to territory they see as rightfully and historically 
theirs, as the last section of this paper illustrates. Living in diaspora ‘here’ but belonging 
‘there’ or ‘here/there’ has allowed some Palestinians in Greece to formulate visions of 
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statehood and citizenship that are based on ‘radical inclusiveness’4 but without letting go 
of feelings of national identity and belonging that are constructed in non-exclusive terms. 
 
Future statehood, citizenship and belonging 
Despite the potentially exclusionary aspects surrounding nationalism and its relationship 
to citizenship and the state, the state appears to be a major factor in the governing and 
organising of contemporary society. Some have argued that the nation-state remains 
important (Triandafyllidou, 1998; Marden, 1997; Ong, 1999), as it is perceived as the 
main way in which people can obtain rights. Therefore, it is unsurprising Palestinians 
cling onto statehood and self-determination as a way to deal with their current 
statelessness. However, although there is always the propensity for us/them relationships 
to occur in the process of state-building that arise out of extreme notions of national 
identity and there are a few Palestinians in Athens who see the differences between Jews 
and Arabs in negative terms, there are also numerous Palestinians who stress that 
although they, as Palestinians, deserve a state to belong to, the lives of Jews and Arabs in 
historical Palestine are and always have been interconnected.  
In turn, this has prompted some of these Palestinians to promote a one-state 
solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in which both Jews and Arabs live together in 
one state, which can be seen as ‘radically inclusive’. It is hard to pinpoint why exactly 
these Palestinians have to come so such a conclusion, but it may be that time spent in the 
West has a role to play. However, as these Palestinians may not have access to political 
institutions in Greece, let alone the West/Bank and Gaza, it is hard to see how such 
                                            
4 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the notion of ‘radical inclusiveness’. 
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positive notions will be able to become a form of political transnationalism and affect the 
current impasse in the region. 
The partial and complex dismantling of the exclusive and problematic aspects of 
the relationships between citizenship and national identity appear related to transnational 
and/or diasporic belonging as well as cross-border connections. Feeling ‘here’ and ‘there’ 
or ‘in-between’ as a result of living in diaspora can help break down normalised 
associations between national or ethnic identity, citizenship and statehood despite the 
perceived need of political attempts to connect them for the sake of advocating the 
Palestinian cause and self-determination.  
A positive repercussion of the realisation that the relationships between 
citizenship and national identity are potentially unstable, arbitrary and do not have to be 
exclusive, can be seen in these Palestinian understandings of the lives of Jews and Arabs 
as intricately connected within a shared homeland. Some Palestinians feel that a one-state 
solution to the present situation within historical Palestine, in which Jews and Arabs live 
together and tolerate their differences and those of others too, is the best solution. This 
may especially be the case for Palestinians who are originally from what is now called 
Israel, as illustrated by the testimonies below by two men whose families are from the 
north part of the land that now constitutes Israel. For example, in response to a question 
on hopes for the future in Palestine, Faeq says: 
 
I think that the future should be a mixture of the 2 states; I think we should live together. 
We are both mixed anyway; we are joined whether we like it or not, so we should have a 
country for everyone. Eventually I think this will happen. Many Palestinians and Israelis 
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would like this. There are a few people in Israel who control everything with absurd 
ideas.                       
 
Ahmed also appears convinced that such a solution is possible, as do other Palestinians in 
Athens: 
 
The ultimate goal, I think should be all of [historical] Palestine for both Jews and 
Palestinians together. I think that if they create a Palestinian state in a two-state 
solution, it will be so small that it won’t survive. It will be too weak. It won’t be practical 
and it will not be a fulfilment for all the hopes we have had for all this time. My ultimate 
hope is to be able to go to Jaffa and to anywhere and everywhere there in historical 
Palestine with the same rights as the Jews; to have equal rights with them, so that we can 
all live together. However, a Palestinian state is a step in the right direction, but I am not 
hopeful that there will be a state. There will only be isolated ghettoes or islands. This 
Apartheid wall that they are building has to be pulled down.  
 
Interviewer: Would you be happy with a two-state solution? 
 
Ahmed: Well, I think, let’s live together and create a democratic state, where both 
Israelis and Palestinians can live together. Israel will not go away; we have to live 
together, with everyone enjoying religious freedom. And I think that many others share 
my views. It’s not easy to forget where you come from or all the problems and the 
suffering you and your people have had to go through. I really don’t think a two-state 
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solution will work because what you will get and what you are already getting is the 
creation of Palestinian islands or ghettoes in an Israeli sea where you need a ferry to 
cross from one island to the other. It is impossible.  
 
Ahmed’s use of the word ‘ghettoes’ is interesting; he purposefully relates present 
Palestinian suffering, injustices and hardship that he feels Israelis are responsible for with 
the ghettoes Jews themselves suffered in. At the same time, however, his rationale in 
using such an argument is important, because it highlights the interconnected lives and 
fates of Jews and Palestinians within a highly contested, problematic piece of land that is 
emotionally and symbolically invested (Shapiro, 2000).  
The views of these Palestinians also help stress that “Palestinian and Israeli, Arab 
and Jew are not natural categories, but politically contingent categories that are forever 
shifting and changing in meaning and implications” (Kelly, 2006: 103). An 
acknowledgement of this can make power-sharing solutions such as the one-state 
proposal and bi-nationalism gain support. For example, Yiftachel and Yacobi (2002) 
have discussed Jerusalem/al-Quds becoming a shared bi-national city, Karmi (1999) has 
advocated a bi-national state, Iris Marion Young (2005) has put forward the notion of 
self-determination as non-domination, Pappe (2004) has outlined Palestinian and Israeli 
histories and most recently, Abunimah’s book (2006) proposes a one state solution.  
In addition to such notions of sharing and inclusiveness, boundary deconstruction 
is also seen as important. For example, Mustafa who is originally from the West Bank, 
also points to the importance of removing boundaries within a future state: 
 
 30
I think there needs to be a solution that can satisfy both parties. So many innocent people 
are dying. We are fighting for the right to live, for our human rights. The thing is you 
can’t get rid of a people or have one country win at the expense of the other. We have 
accepted unjust negotiations like Oslo and the road map. We want peace, because I don’t 
know how long the Palestinians can take it…. You know, I believe there should be no 
borders anywhere. They don’t do any good. They are like obstacles. People should be 
free to move around wherever they want. 
 
Interviewer: It’s ironic then, isn’t it that this whole conflict is about borders, defining 
concrete borders and a defined territory called Palestine. Aren’t borders important in 
some contexts? 
 
Mustafa (Silence): Yes, you need to define areas, but they shouldn’t be restrictive or limit 
travelling. 
 
The material and symbolic dismantling of borders and of negatively constructed 
differences between people and the consequent recognition of a joint destiny within the 
same land are very powerful notions. The potential, however, for the creation of new 
boundaries, tensions and constructions of difference is always present. For Palestinians in 
Athens to come to such conclusions involves an understanding of the importance of 
diversity, tolerance and the multiplicity of situated and dynamic identities, as well as the 
decoupling of citizenship and national identity within a future Palestinian state or national 
identity that is constructed in non-exclusive ways. There is more work to be done to 
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explore the repercussions of living in the West on notions of future citizenship and 
whether this constitutes a form of political transnationalism that has the power to help 
resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in ways that are not based around exclusivist 
notions of the relationships between citizenship and national identity but still allow 
people to belong to a territorialised homeland. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has examined constructions of the relationships between national identity and 
citizenship in relation to the Palestinian diaspora in Athens. It stresses the need for 
nuanced and careful understandings of the relationships between those exiled in diaspora 
and their homeland/host countries, particularly for those who are politicised, stateless or 
who have ambiguous relations to the state in which they currently live (and which may 
also be problematic in relation to a future state). As Nagel and Staeheli (2004: 4) stress: 
“geographies of community, identity and citizenship are more complex and are in greater 
flux than much of the contemporary debate [on these issues] implies”. This paper has 
illustrated that due to statelessness and complex legal status Palestinians in Athens have 
strategically acquired pragmatic citizenship out of necessity, which enables differing 
forms of belonging that are not necessarily exclusive but that may be constructed and 
deconstructed for particular politicised and material reasons.  
Although notions such as Soysal’s (1998) ‘post-national membership’ and 
Tambini’s ‘post-national citizenship’ (2001) may be important for those living in 
diaspora, pragmatic citizenship may be more relevant at times as it takes into account the 
need to belong to a defined but de/re territorialized nation and/or have multiple 
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attachments and the importance attached to states as the providers of citizenship status. 
Above all, it stresses the need for the decoupling of exclusive relationships between 
citizenship and national identity. The pertinence of nationalism and the institutional 
constraints imposed by countries (Bailey et al. 2002) and how the lives of those in 
diaspora are affected as a result must be recognised and cannot be ignored. However, as 
Fine (1999: 154) also reminds us, “nationalism is a fickle beast. In its best moods, it 
liberates human beings from colonial oppression and unites people previously fragmented 
but it also excludes those deemed not to belong and demands the active assent of its 
‘own’ nationals”. At the same time, despite their potential for exclusivities, it also has to 
be remembered that national identity and nationalism are malleable, complex and 
dynamic constructions that are contested through time and space (Armstrong, 1998).  
Those in diaspora, as citizens or not, may be in a difficult position as they realise 
the importance of cross-border connections and boundary transgressions, but at the same 
time are limited and hindered by the borders protected and enforced by nation-state 
institutions who may still try to protect citizenship that is based on potentially exclusive 
notions of national identity. However, this paper has shown that despite the jus sanguinis 
nature of Greek citizenship, its acquisition (and potential acquisition) by Palestinians 
does not necessitate them to feel as if they are fully Greek. Palestinians in Athens are 
aware of (and utilise) pragmatic citizenship that in turn allows them to construct strong 
notions of belonging and attachment that may be singular, dual or multiple and that 
allows them to obtain rights in the host country. Pragmatic citizenship can also lead to 
inclusive visions of self-determination and future citizenship in a one-state solution in 
which Jews and Arabs live together and where all Palestinians displaced may be included 
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and given the Right to Return. Given the struggles in this part of the world, such 
perceptions and notions of citizenship as pragmatic that allow for the deconstruction of 
exclusive relationships between citizenship and national identity are useful for long-term 
and future scenarios of peace in the region.  
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